Problem Set 8 – Due Wednesday, March 13, 2019

Problem 24. Do the following without a calculator or computer, showing your work. None should be overly tedious. (a) Compute \(7^{890002} \mod 1111\). Note that 1111 is the product of primes \(p = 11\) and \(q = 101\). (b) Compute \(7^{890002} \mod 101\). (c) Compute \(2^{64} \mod 101\).

Problem 25. Suppose Alice wants to send three messages to Bob: \(m, m+1, \text{ and } m+2\). Bob uses an RSA public key \(N\) with exponent \(e = 3\). Messages \(m, m+1, \text{ and } m+2\) are all in \(\mathbb{Z}_N^*\). Alice uses raw RSA to encrypt her messages: she computes \(c_1 = m^3 \mod N\), \(c_2 = (m+1)^3 \mod N\), and \(c_3 = (m+2)^3 \mod N\), and sends the three messages to Bob. Show how an eavesdropper Eve who intercepts \(c_1, c_2, \text{ and } c_3\) can recover \(m\).

Problem 26. Consider the following “left-or-right” security notion for a public-key encryption scheme \(\Pi = (K, E, D)\):

\[
\text{Adv}_{lr}^{\Pi}(A, k) = \Pr[(pk, sk) \leftarrow K(k): A^{E(pk, \text{Left}(\cdot, \cdot))}(pk) \Rightarrow 1] - \Pr[(pk, sk) \leftarrow K(k): A^{E(pk, \text{Right}(\cdot, \cdot))}(pk) \Rightarrow 1]
\]

where oracle \(\text{Left}(X, Y)\) returns \(X\) when \(|X| = |Y|\); oracle \(\text{Right}(X, Y)\) returns \(Y\) when \(|X| = |Y|\); and both oracles return \(\perp\) when \(|X| \neq |Y|\). In contrast, our old security notion was

\[
\text{Adv}_{\text{ind}}^{\Pi}(A, k) = \Pr[(pk, sk) \leftarrow K(k): A^{E(pk, \cdot)}(pk) \Rightarrow 1] - \Pr[(pk, sk) \leftarrow K(k): A^{E(pk, 0)}(pk) \Rightarrow 1]
\]

Show that \(lr\)-security implies \(\text{ind}\)-security.

If you like, you may also show that \(\text{ind}\)-security implies \(lr\)-security.

Problem 27. Let \(\Pi = (K, E, D)\) be a public-key encryption scheme. Can it be \(\text{ind}\)-secure with each of the following “defects”? Briefly justify each answer you give.

Part A. Encryption of a plaintext \(M\) leaks the last bit of \(M\)—it is easily computable from the ciphertext \(C\).

Part B. Encryption of a plaintext \(M\) leaks the length of \(M\)—it is easily computable from the ciphertext \(C\).

Part C. Encryption of a plaintext \(M\) leaks the identity of the key \(pk\) with which it is encrypted—it is easy to distinguish if a given ciphertext was meant for Alice (it’s encrypted under her key) or for Bob (it’s encrypted under his).

Part D. Encryption of equal-length plaintexts \(M\) and \(M'\) can take radically different amounts of time.

Part E. Encryption of the secret key \(sk\) under its public key \(pk\) leaks \(sk\)—it is easily computable from the ciphertext \(C\).